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Markets are central to modern society, so their failures can be
devastating. Here, we examine a prominent failure: price bubbles.
Bubbles emerge when traders err collectively in pricing, causing
misfit between market prices and the true values of assets. The
causes of such collective errors remain elusive. We propose that
bubbles are affected by ethnic homogeneity in the market and can
be thwarted by diversity. In homogenous markets, traders place
undue confidence in the decisions of others. Less likely to
scrutinize others’ decisions, traders are more likely to accept prices
that deviate from true values. To test this, we constructed exper-
imental markets in Southeast Asia and North America, where par-
ticipants traded stocks to earn money. We randomly assigned
participants to ethnically homogeneous or diverse markets. We
find a marked difference: Across markets and locations, market
prices fit true values 58% better in diverse markets. The effect is
similar across sites, despite sizeable differences in culture and
ethnic composition. Specifically, in homogenous markets, over-
pricing is higher as traders are more likely to accept speculative
prices. Their pricing errors are more correlated than in diverse
markets. In addition, when bubbles burst, homogenous markets
crash more severely. The findings suggest that price bubbles arise
not only from individual errors or financial conditions, but also
from the social context of decision making. The evidence may
inform public discussion on ethnic diversity: it may be beneficial
not only for providing variety in perspectives and skills, but also
because diversity facilitates friction that enhances deliberation
and upends conformity.
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In modern society, markets are ubiquitous (1). We rely on themnot only to furnish necessities but also to finance businesses,
provide healthcare, control pollution, and predict events (2). The
market has become such a central social institution because it
typically excels in aggregating information and expectations from
disparate traders, thereby setting prices and allocating resources
better than any individual or government (3). However, markets
can go astray, and here we examine a prominent failure of
markets: price bubbles (4–6).
Bubbles emerge when traders err collectively in pricing, causing
a persistent misfit between the market price and the true value
(also known as “intrinsic” or “fundamental” value) of an asset,
such as a stock (7, 8). Bubbles devastate individuals and markets,
wreck nations, and destabilize the entire world economy. When
a stock market bubble burst in 1929, the Great Depression ma-
terialized (6). After its “bubble economy” ruptured in 1990, Japan
stagnated for decades. More recently, housing bubbles in the
United States and Europe caused a financial crisis, burdening the
global economy since (3, 7).
Price bubbles can wreck people, markets, and nations, but they
also present a puzzle. That people occasionally err is unsurprising—
psychologists and economists have documented myriad individual
biases—but individual errors do not necessitate a bubble. Traders
vie for advantage, so if some unwittingly misprice an asset, for ex-
ample by paying lofty prices, competitors should exploit the error by
offering to sell dearly, thereby profiting from others’ mistakes (9).
At the same time, the sellers also increase supply and depress pri-
ces, which should prevent a bubble. In other words, even if some
traders err, the market as a whole should still price accurately—
markets are thought to be self-correcting (3). For price bubbles to
emerge, pricing errors must be not idiosyncratic, but common
among traders.
Attempting to pinpoint the cause of bubbles, some researchers
have designed experimental markets that are ideally suited for
accurate decision making. However, even there—with skilled
participants who possess complete information about the true
values of the stocks traded—bubbles persist (7, 8). Researchers
have shown that bubbles are related to financial conditions such
as excess cash (10), but also to behavior that exhibits “elements
of irrationality” (11). Indeed, bubbles have been long ascribed to
collective delusions, implied in terms such as “herd behavior”
and “animal spirits” (12–14), but their exact causes remain
nebulous. We suggest that that price bubbles arise not only from
individual errors or financial conditions but also from the social
context of decision making.
We draw on studies that have used simulations (15), ethno-
graphic accounts of an arbitrage disaster (9), and qualitative
research on the recent financial crisis (16) that point to the
dangers of homogeneity. We also rely on past research in-
vestigating the effects of diversity on the performance of countries
and regions, organizations, and teams. Our results suggest that
bubbles are affected by a property of the collectivity of market
traders—ethnic homogeneity.
Homogeneity and diversity have been studied across the social
sciences. A commonly accepted view is that cognitive diversity,
an assortment of perspectives and skills, enables exchange of
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valuable information, thereby enhancing creativity and problem
solving (15, 17). However, when it comes to ethnic diversity, the
effects are decidedly mixed. Ethnic diversity has been studied in
multiple spheres, including economic growth (18, 19), social
capital (20), cities and neighborhoods (21), organizations (17,
22), work teams (23–25), and jury deliberations (26). Some
studies find benefits, but others do not. For instance, ethnic di-
versity in a city or region can summon a multitude of abilities,
experiences, and cultures, but can also bring heterogeneity in
preferences and mores, which complicates public policy decisions
(18, 27) and may hamper collective action (20). In the workplace,
ethnic diversity is associated with greater innovation, but also
increased conflict (28).
Some of the disparity can be explained by the results we report
here: Ethnic diversity facilitates friction. This friction can in-
crease conflict in some group settings, whether a work team,
a community, or a region (29). Conversely, ethnic homogeneity
may induce confidence, or instrumental trust (30), in others’
decisions (confidence not necessarily in their benevolence or
morality, but in the reasonableness of their decisions, as captured
in such everyday statements as “I trust his judgment”). However,
in modern markets, vigilant skepticism is beneficial; overreliance
on others’ decisions is risky.
As Portes and Vikstorm (31) note, modern “markets do not
run on social capital; they operate instead on the basis of uni-
versalistic rules and their embodiment in specific roles.” In other
words, modern markets rely less on the mechanical solidarity
engendered by coethnicity, the “bounded solidarity” (32) em-
bodied for instance in the Maghribi traders’ coalition (33) or the
rotating credit associations of Southeast Asia (34, 35). Instead,
modern markets rely on organic solidary, which turns on het-
erogeneity, role differentiation, and division of labor (31, 36).
Ethnic homogeneity may be beneficial in some group settings for
the same reason it may be detrimental to modern markets—it
instills confidence in others’ decisions.
Confidence in others’ decisions matters because, in many sit-
uations, people watch others for cues about appropriate behavior
(37). When people enter a market, whether to purchase stock, buy
a house, or hire an employee, they heed not only the objective
features of the good or service—the performance of the company,
the number of bedrooms, the years of work experience—but they
also note the behavior of others, attempting to decipher their
mindset before deciding how to act (12, 13, 38). In a modern
market, where competition is key, undue confidence in others’
decisions is counterproductive: It can discourage scrutiny and en-
courage imitation of others’ decisions, ultimately causing bubbles.
In ethnically homogenous markets, we propose, traders place
greater confidence in the actions of others. They are more likely
to accept their coethnics’ decisions as reasonable, and therefore
more likely to act alike. Compared with those in an ethnically
diverse market, traders in a homogenous market are less likely to
scrutinize others’ behavior. Conversely, in a diverse market,
traders are more likely to scrutinize others’ behavior and less
likely to assume that others’ decisions are reasonable.
This proposition is galvanized by a persistent empirical finding
across the social sciences: People tend to be more trusting of the
perspectives, actions, and intentions of ethnically similar others
(21, 39, 40). As intergroup contact theory and social identity
theory establish, shared ethnic identity is a broad basis for estab-
lishing trust among strangers. Moreover, empirical evidence shows
specifically that people surrounded by ethnic peers tend to process
information more superficially (26, 41, 42). Such superficial
thinking fits with the notion of greater confidence in others’
decisions: If one assumes that others’ decisions are reasonable,
one may exert less effort in scrutinizing them. For instance, eth-
nically diverse juries consider a wider range of perspectives, de-
liberate longer, and make fewer inaccurate statements than
homogeneous juries (26). Compared with those in homogeneous
discussion groups, students who are told they will join diverse
discussion groups review the discussion materials more thoroughly
beforehand (42) and write more complex postdiscussion essays
(41). In markets, where information is incomplete and decisions
are uncertain (43), traders may be particularly reliant on ethnicity
as a group-level heuristic for establishing confidence in others’
decisions. Such superficial information processing can engender
conformity, herding, and price bubbles. As the term implies,
herding is not the outcome of careful analysis but of observational
imitation (14).
Therefore, we propose that, when an offer is made to buy or to
sell an asset, traders in homogeneous markets are more likely to
accept it than those in diverse markets. If traders in homoge-
neous markets place greater confidence in the decisions of their
coethnics, so they are more likely to accept offers that are further
from true value. This is not an individual idiosyncrasy, but
a collective phenomenon: Pricing errors of traders in homoge-
nous markets are more likely to be correlated than those of
traders in diverse markets. The culmination of these processes
leads to bubbles that are bigger.
To study the effects of diversity on markets, we created ex-
perimental markets in Southeast Asia (study 1) and North
America (study 2). We selected those locales purposefully. The
ethnic groups in them are distinct and nonoverlapping—Chinese,
Malays, and Indians in Southeast Asia, and Whites, Latinos, and
African-Americans in North America—thus allowing a broad
comparison. We also sought more generalizable results by in-
cluding participants beyond Western, rich, industrialized, and
democratic nations (44).
Realistic trading requires financial skills, so we turned to those
who are likely to possess it. For study 1, in Southeast Asia, we
recruited skilled participants, trained in business or finance, for
a “stock-trading simulation.”We surveyed their demographics in
advance and randomly assigned them to markets (trading ses-
sions) as to create a collectivity of traders that was either eth-
nically homogeneous or diverse (Fig. 1). In the homogeneous
markets, all participants were drawn from the dominant ethnicity
in the locale; in the diverse markets, at least one of the partic-
ipants was an ethnic minority. All traders could view their
counterparts and note the ethnicities present in the market.
When the participants arrived in the trading laboratory, we
provided them with all of the information necessary to calculate
the stocks’ true value accurately, including examples. After they
read the instructions (and before actual trading), we assessed
each participant’s comprehension and financial (pricing) skills.
We presented each participant separately with simple market
scenarios and asked him or her to declare the prices in which he
or she would buy or sell in each scenario. The participants could
not see the others’ responses. We used the responses to calculate
ex-ante pricing accuracy: the extent to which the participants’
responses, in aggregate, approximated the true values of the
stocks. This measure of pricing accuracy serves as a baseline of
performance. Because the responses were collected individually,
and participants could not observe others’ responses, social in-
fluence was minimal at this stage. Fig. 1 provides a visual over-
view of the experiment.
Next, participants were allocated cash and stocks and began
trading. Much as in a modern stock market, participants ob-
served all of the trading activity on their computer screens. They
saw the prices at which others bid to buy and asked to sell. They
saw what others ultimately paid and received. As various finan-
cial features of the market can affect bubbles (45–47), we control
these through the experimental design. While trading, partic-
ipants could not see each other or communicate directly. As in
modern stock markets, they did not know which trader made
a certain bid or offer. So, direct social influence was curtailed,
but herding was possible. When trading ended, the participants
received their earnings in cash. Then, we used the prices in which
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stocks were bought and sold to calculate the ex-post pricing ac-
curacy: the extent to which market prices, on average, approxi-
mated the true values of the stocks.
For study 2, a replication in North America, we followed the
same protocol. An exact, or direct, replication further suggests
that the pattern we observed is general, independent of specific
culture or demographics (48). So we selected a wholly different
site, distinct by culture and encompassing a different mix of
ethnicities.
Results
We begin, most generally, by calculating the magnitude of bub-
bles in diverse and homogenous markets. As done frequently (4),
we assess the magnitude by the extent to which prices, in ag-
gregate, match the true values of stocks (Haessel’s R2). We find
a marked difference: Traders in ethnically homogeneous markets
are significantly less accurate, and thus more likely to cause price
bubbles (b = 0.297, t(27) = 4.06, P < 0.001, robust regression of
Haessel’s R2 on a treatment indicator, controlling for location-
fixed effects; “b” denotes the estimated coefficient on a binary
treatment indicator; details are in SI Appendix, Table S2). Across
markets and locations, pricing accuracy is 58% higher in diverse
markets (SI Appendix, Table S1). Markets in the two sites differ
in absolute pricing accuracy, probably because of educational
differences, but the contrast between diverse and homogeneous
markets is remarkably alike (Fig. 2 A and B).
It is possible that traders in homogenous markets were
somehow less skilled to begin with, but because we measured
each participant’s pricing accuracy before trading, establishing
a baseline, we can pinpoint how this accuracy is affected by
trading in a diverse or homogeneous market (ex-post accuracy;
Fig. 3). This is a cautious measure: As one may expect that prices
in trading (ex-post) will be more accurate than those measured in
a questionnaire before trading (ex-ante). Foremost, markets are
thought to be self-correcting (3), so by aggregating offers to buy
and sell from all traders, the market price should be more ac-
curate than individual estimates. Second, the market scenarios
that we used for measuring ex-ante pricing accuracy provided the
participants an opportunity to contemplate and practice pricing,
an opportunity that should enhance accuracy during trading.
Finally, participants could earn money by performing well in
trading, but not with the pretrading market scenarios, so they
had an incentive to excel.
We find that ethnic diversity makes a difference during trad-
ing. In diverse markets, average fit improves during trading:
pricing errors drop. However, in homogeneous markets, average
fit does not improve—instead, it often deteriorates. In such
markets, prices established during trading were no more accurate
Fig. 1. The experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to markets that were ethnically homogeneous or diverse (Left). After they received the in-
formation needed to price stocks accurately, we assessed each participant’s financial skills individually, using 10 hypothetical market scenarios to establish
a baseline of pricing accuracy (Center). Trading in a computerized stock market, each participant was free to buy and sell stocks and/or to make requests to
buy (“bid”) or offers to sell (“ask”). All trading information was true, public, and anonymous: All participants could see all completed transactions and bid and
ask offers (Right; see example in SI Appendix, Fig. S8). The data reflect actual prices in the sixth period of trading in two of the markets of study 1. The
experiment did not involve deception.
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(often less accurate) than the average individual responses col-
lected separately before trading. When surrounded by coethnics,
even those with superior pricing skills, as assessed before trading,
were likely to commit pricing errors, buying and selling above
true value. Homogeneous markets do not correct individual
errors—they preserve or even exacerbate them (Fig. 3).
We find that the ethnic composition of a market causes sig-
nificant differences in pricing accuracy during trading, and also
affects how accuracy changes. Whereas accuracy improves in
diverse markets, in homogeneous markets errors are preserved
or exacerbated. We find no evidence of preexisting differences in
accuracy between traders in homogeneous and diverse markets.
Regressing ex-ante accuracy on a treatment condition (homo-
geneous or diverse), while controlling for location-fixed effects,
shows that treatment had no significant effect [b = −0.003, t(27) =
−0.04, P = 0.926; SI Appendix, Table S7]. Rather, the differences
stem from trading in a homogeneous (or diverse) market.
Next, we investigate the individual behaviors underlying these
results. We find that trading prices are significantly lower in di-
verse markets [b = −9.997, t(2,018) = −6.13, P < 0.001, transaction-
level regression of price on diversity condition, controlling for
true value, period, and location-fixed effects; column (1) of SI
Appendix, Table S3]. However, in diverse markets prices are not
only lower—they are significantly closer to the true values. Pricing
errors are smaller. The results hold regardless of whether we
consider absolute distance to true value [b = −8.942, t(2,018) =
−6.55, P < 0.001; column (2) of SI Appendix, Table S3], relative
distance [b = −0.262, t(2,018) = −4.78, P < 0.001; column (3) of SI
Appendix, Table S3], or relative absolute distance [b = −0.278,
t(2,018) = −4.90, P < 0.001; column (4) of SI Appendix, Table S3].
Whether the market is homogeneous or diverse explains a
great deal of variance in trading prices. When we consider the
effect of homogeneity and diversity together with controls, we
find that these explain almost a third of the variance in trading
prices (SI Appendix, Table S3, all specifications).
Pricing errors happen when traders accept an offer to buy or
sell at prices that differ from true value, so we examined what
makes an offer acceptable. We find that offers are more likely to
be accepted in homogeneous markets than in diverse ones [b =
0.150, z(6,178) = 2.61, P < 0.01, Probit regression; column (2) of SI
Appendix, Table S4], even after statistically controlling for other
variables that affect prices. In addition, the effects of homoge-
neity are more pronounced the further an offer is from true
value. Traders in homogenous markets are more likely to accept
offers that are above true value. This supports the notion that
traders in homogenous markets place undue confidence in the
decisions of others—they are more likely to spread others’ errors
by accepting inflated offers, paying prices that are far from true
values. Traders in diverse markets are more likely to reject such
offers (analyses in SI Appendix, Table S4).
Finally, we examine the burst of bubbles, analyzing the effect
of diversity on the peak-to-trough change in pricing. We find that
bubbles in homogenous markets burst more severely. Diversity
softens the blow: Even if diverse markets occasionally move away
from true values, crashes are significantly less severe [b = −2.510,
t(28) = −2.09, P < 0.045, session-level regression of peak-to-trough
distance on treatment controlling for location; SI Appendix, Table
S5]. The diversity condition explains more than a quarter of the
peak-to-trough change (SI Appendix, Table S5).
Of course, people can err idiosyncratically, because of igno-
rance or confusion. They certainly do so in our experiments, but
common error—a statistical measure that filters out idiosyncratic
errors to identify similar errors (49)—is significantly higher in
homogeneous markets than in diverse ones [b = −1,009, t(27) =
−1.90, P < 0.068, session-level regression of common error on
treatment, controlling for location; SI Appendix, Table S6]. In
homogenous markets, errors are more likely to be correlated.
Discussion
Markets are central to modern society, and their failures can dev-
astate people, communities, and nations. We find that price bubbles
are fueled by the ethnic homogeneity of traders. Homogeneity, we
suggest, imbues people with false confidence in the judgment of
coethnics, discouraging them from scrutinizing behavior. In contrast,
traders in diverse markets reliably price assets closer to true values.
They are less likely to accept offers inflated offers and more likely
to accept offers that are closer to true value, thereby thwarting
bubbles. This pattern is similar in Southeast Asia andNorthAmerica,
even if the two sites differ greatly in culture and ethnic composition,
in what is implied by “ethnic diversity” and how it is operationalized.
The experimental markets we use here are a judicious setting
for examining the effects of homogeneity. Real markets are less
transparent and more uncertain: The probability of future events
is unknown. Uncertainty enables alternative interpretations of
the same information, letting biases exert even stronger effect on
decisions. We suspect that our results underestimate the detri-
mental effect of homogeneity in real markets.
It is not surprising that people err in cognitive tasks: Econo-
mists and psychologists have cataloged numerous individual
cognitive biases (43). However, we suggest that biases may stem
not only from the limits of individual cognition, but also from the
social context in which decisions are embedded. Homogeneity
(or diversity) is not a feature of individuals, but of a collective:
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Fig. 2. Pricing accuracy in diverse and homogeneousmarkets across studies: (A)
Southeast Asia and (B) North America. Pricing accuracy in trading (ex-post fit
between market prices and true values) across diversity conditions and sites,
measured by Haessel’s R2. Higher score signifies higher pricing accuracy; the
lower the score, the worse the accuracy, the greater the bubble. Error bars
represent SEMs. Difference (across diversity conditions) in ex-post pricing accu-
racy in SoutheastAsia= 0.302, t(21)= 3.059, two-tailed P< 0.01; inNorthAmerica=
0.284, t(9) = 3.593, two-tailed P < 0.05. The results are robust whether using
parametric or nonparametric statistical tests (SI Appendix). They are based on
2,022 market transactions by 180 individual traders in 30 markets, of which 16
were homogeneous and 14 diverse. Details are in SI Appendix, Table S1.
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a team, a community, or a market. Collective biases have been long
alluded to, but rarely measured (14). More broadly, homogeneity
may play a critical role in herding—the convergence of people’s
beliefs and behaviors through interaction—also known as (or re-
lated to) cascading, social contagion, peer effects, informational
social influence, social proof, or institutionalization (50). If, as we
find, markets populated by skilled traders possessing complete
information are still so affected by homogeneity, it may have an
even more pronounced role in other instances of herding, such
as the spread of fashions, fads, false beliefs, and riots.
Our findings also inform the debate on diversity and multi-
culturalism (51). Some proponents of ethnic diversity justify it as
a moral imperative, a reparation for inequality. Others argue
that ethnic diversity can boost performance by bringing a broader
range of perspectives, but the evidence is equivocal.
We propose a novel benefit: In our experiments, ethnic diversity
leads all traders, whether of majority or minority ethnicity, to price
more accurately and thwart bubbles. Ethnic diversity was valuable
not necessarily because minority traders contributed unique in-
formation or skills, but their mere presence changed the tenor of
decision making among all traders. Diversity benefited the market.
This explanation differs from those revolving around the
benefits of cognitive diversity, when people contribute an as-
sortment of perspectives and skills. It is thus broadly consistent
with research that examines the detrimental effects inherent in
ethnic homogeneity (52–54). Our explanation further attempts
to connect individual processes to market-level outcomes.
Through these lenses, the disparate findings on ethnic diversity
appear more congruent: Diversity facilitates friction. In markets,
this friction can disrupt conformity, interrupt taken-for-gran-
ted routines, and prevent herding. The presence of more than
one ethnicity fosters greater scrutiny and more deliberate
thinking, which can lead to better outcomes. Such friction,
however, can cause conflict and complicate collective decisions.
The challenge, then, is in establishing rules and institutions to
address ethnic diversity and its effects. Without them, conflict can
be destructive; with them, diversity can benefit the collective.
Materials and Methods
In both studies 1 and 2, participants were randomly assigned to an ethnically
diverse or homogeneous six-person market (Fig. 1). Random assignment is
meant to ensure that the markets were not systematically different from
each other. Participants sat in a waiting room with the other traders, and
then each was led to a separate cubicle. We presented each participant,
separately, with instructions and the information needed to price stocks ac-
curately. Then, we assessed the baseline pricing accuracy of each participant
by asking about a range of hypothetical market scenarios (e.g., “How much
would you pay for a stock in round 6?”). When answering the questions,
participants were permitted to consult the instructions and information.
Next, participants familiarized themselves with the market—a double
auction market based on the seminal design of Smith et al. (7) and pro-
grammed in z-Tree (55) (the code is publicly available). The participants had
a practice trading and could ask questions. Then, they began trading for real
money over a series of 10 rounds. Trading conditions resembled a modern,
computerized stock market: Each participant was free to buy and sell stocks
and/or to make offers for buying (“bid”) or selling (“ask”). Trading in-
formation was public and anonymous: all participants could see all com-
pleted transactions and bid and ask offers, but not the identities of the other
traders (SI Appendix, Fig. S8). When trading concluded, participants received
a cash payment as per their market earnings.
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